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In December 2009 I travelled to Copenhagen for the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 15). I did not at-
tend any of the official meetings in the Bella Center, where 
the conference was based, but rather participated outside the 
conference in a range of protest activities directed against the 
actions (and more importantly the inactions) of the official 
parties. There is much to be said about the protest tactics em-
ployed in Copenhagen as well as the strategy of summit pro-
tests more generally, but the events led me primarily toward 
theoretical reflections about the relationship between the 
two predominant components of the protests: anticapitalist 
social movements and social movements to address climate 
change. These two groups of movements share a profound 
link, it seems to me, in that they are focused on the manage-
ment of the common, which is quickly becoming the central 
terrain of political struggle across a wide variety of political 
contexts. And yet these movements stand in different relation 
to the common and even focus on different forms of the com-
mon, posing a series of conceptual antinomies and political 
challenges. The interactions among the activist movements 
surrounding the Copenhagen Summit was for me a first op-
portunity to see clearly and work through some of these an-
tinomies and challenges. 
The primary political differences among the movements, 
in my view, as well as the antinomies that to some degree stand 
behind them, flow from the fact that they focus on distinct 
forms of the common, which have dissimilar qualities. On 
the one hand, for climate change movements and ecological 
movements more generally, the common refers primarily to 
the Earth and its ecosystems, including the atmosphere, the 
oceans and rivers, and the forests, as well as all the forms of life 
that interact with them. Anticapitalist social movements, on 
the other hand, generally understand the common in terms of 
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the products of human labor and creativity that we share, such as ideas, knowledges, 
images, codes, affects, social relationships, and the like. These common goods are 
becoming increasingly central in capitalist production—a fact that has a series of 
important consequences for efforts to maintain or reform the capitalist system as well 
as projects to resist or overthrow it. As first approximations you could call these two 
realms the ecological common and the social/economic common, or the natural and 
the artificial common, although these categories quickly prove insufficient.
There are at least two essential respects in which these two domains of the com-
mon are animated by contrasting logics. First, whereas most ecological discourses 
regarding the common highlight the limits of the Earth and the forms of life that 
interact with it, discussions of the social or artificial forms of the common generally 
concentrate on the open, limitless nature of the production of the common. Second, 
whereas many environmental discourses generate a sphere of interest much broader 
than the human or animal worlds, the social/economic discourses generally maintain 
the interests of humanity as central. My suspicion is that these seeming oppositions 
will eventually turn out, after investigation, to indicate potential complementarities 
rather than contradictory relations between these two guises of the common as well 
as between the forms of political action required in each. But much work is required 
to arrive at that point.
Before looking more closely at these differences, though, and the political chal-
lenges they present, I want to dwell briefly on the potential and existing connections 
among movements for the common. In many but not all respects the two guises of 
the common function according to the same logic, and this is primarily what consti-
tutes the basis of the profound link among the diverse movements. Both forms of the 
common, for example, defy and are deteriorated by property relations. In addition, 
perhaps as a corollary, the common in both domains confounds the traditional mea-
sures of economic value and imposes instead the value of life as the only valid scale 
of evaluation. Indeed the divisions between the ecological and the social become 
blurred from this biopolitical standpoint. 
The theoretical discussion must begin by establishing the centrality of the com-
mon, which is much more advanced and widespread in ecological thought than in 
other domains. Not only do we generally share the benefits of interaction with the 
Earth, the sun, and the oceans but also we are all affected by their degradation. Air 
and water pollution are not confined to the location where they are produced, of 
course, and they are not limited by national boundaries; climate change similarly 
affects the entire planet. This is not the say that such changes affect everyone in the 
same way: rising ocean levels, for example, may have the most immediate impact in 
Bangladesh or a Pacific island nation, whereas increasingly severe droughts may most 
dramatically affect Ethiopia or Bolivia. The common, though, is the basic foundation 
of ecological thought against which the singularities of specific locations stand out.
In social and economic thought, however, the centrality of the common is not 
as widely recognized. The claim for its centrality relies on a claim or hypothesis that, 
along with many others, Toni Negri and I have explored over the last ten years: we 
are in the midst of an epochal shift from a capitalist economy centered on indus-
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trial production to one centered on what can be called immaterial or biopolitical 
production. This claim is today increasingly but by no means universally accepted. 
For clarity let me break down the claim into its three component elements. The first 
of these is generally acknowledged: for much of the last two centuries the capitalist 
economy has been centered on industrial production. That does not mean that most 
of the workers throughout this period were in factories—in fact, the majority were 
not. Indeed who worked in industry rather than the fields or the home was a central 
determinant in the geographical, racial, and gender divisions of labor. Industrial 
production was central, rather, in the sense that the qualities of industry—its forms 
of mechanization, its working day, its wage relations, its regimes of time discipline 
and precision, and so forth—were progressively imposed over other sectors of pro-
duction and social life as a whole, creating not only an industrial economy but also 
an industrial society.
The second element of the claim is also relatively uncontroversial: industrial pro-
duction no longer holds the central position in the capitalist economy. This does not 
mean that fewer people are working in factories today but rather that industry no 
longer marks the hierarchical position in the various divisions of labor and, more 
significantly, that the qualities of industry are no longer being imposed over other 
sectors and society as a whole.
The final element of the hypothesis is the most complex and requires extended 
argument and qualification. The claim, to state it most briefly, is that there is emerg-
ing today in the central position that industry once occupied the production of 
immaterial goods or goods with a significant immaterial component, such as ideas, 
knowledges, languages, images, code, and affects. Occupations involved in immate-
rial production range from the high to the low end of the economy, from health care 
workers and educators to fast food workers, call center workers, and flight attendants. 
Once again, this is not a quantitative claim but a claim about the qualities that are 
progressively being imposed over other sectors of the economy and society as a 
whole. In other words, the cognitive and affective tools of immaterial production, 
the precarious, non-guaranteed nature of its wage relations, the temporality of im-
material production (which tends to destroy the structures of the working day and 
blur the traditional divisions between work-time and nonwork-time), as well as its 
other qualities are becoming generalized.
This form of production should be understood as biopolitical insofar as what is 
being produced is ultimately social relations and forms of life. In this context tradi-
tional economic divisions between production and reproduction tend to fade away. 
Forms of life are simultaneously produced and reproduced. Here we can begin to see 
the proximity between biopolitical production and ecological thought, since both are 
focused on the production/reproduction of forms of life—with the important differ-
ence that the ecological perspective extends the notion of forms of life well beyond 
the limits of the human or the animal (but more on that later).
One can also approach the hypothesis of the emerging dominant position of im-
material or biopolitical production in terms of historical changes in the hierarchy of 
forms of property. Before industry occupied the central position in the economy, up 
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to the early 19th century, immobile property, such as land, held a dominant position 
with respect to other forms of property. In the long era of the centrality of industry, 
however, mobile property, such as commodities, came to dominate over immobile 
property. Today we are in the midst of a similar transition, one in which immaterial 
and reproducible property is taking the dominant position over material property. 
Indeed patents, copyrights, and other methods to regulate and maintain exclusive 
control over immaterial property are subject of the most active debates in the field 
of property law. The rising importance of immaterial and reproducible property can 
serve as evidence for or at least indication of the emerging centrality of immaterial 
production. 
Whereas in the earlier period of transition the contest between dominant forms 
of property turned on the question of mobility (immobile land versus mobile com-
modities), today the contest focuses attention on exclusivity and reproducibility. 
Private property in the form of steel beams, automobiles, and television sets obey 
the logic of scarcity: if you are using them, I cannot. Immaterial property such as 
brands, code, and music, in contrast, can be reproduced in an unlimited way. In fact, 
many such immaterial products only function to their full potential when they are 
shared in an open way. The usefulness to you of an idea or an affect is not diminished 
by your sharing it with me. On the contrary, it becomes useful only by being shared 
in common.
This is what it means to say that the common is becoming central in today’s 
capitalist economy. First, the form of production emerging in the dominant position 
results generally in immaterial or biopolitical goods that tend to be common. Their 
nature is social and reproducible such that it is increasingly difficult to maintain 
exclusive control over them. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the productiv-
ity of such goods in future economic development depends on their being com-
mon. Keeping ideas and knowledges private hinders the production of new ideas 
and knowledges, just as private languages and private affects are sterile and useless. 
If this hypothesis is correct, then, paradoxically, capital increasingly relies on the 
common.
This brings me back to the first logical characteristic shared by the common in 
both the ecological and social/economic domains: they both defy and are deterio-
rated by property relations. In the social/economic domain, not only is it difficult 
to police exclusive rights over immaterial forms of property, as I said, but making 
biopolitical goods private also diminishes their future productivity. In other words, 
a powerful contradiction is emerging at the heart of capitalist production between 
the need for the common in the interest of productivity and the need for the private 
in the interest of capitalist accumulation. This contradiction can be conceived as a 
new version of the classic opposition, often cited in Marxist and communist thought, 
between the socialization of production and the private nature of accumulation. The 
struggle over so-called bio-piracy in Brazil, India, and elsewhere is one contempo-
rary theater of this clash. Indigenous knowledges and the medicinal properties of 
certain Amazonian plants, for example, are patented by transnational corporations 
and made private property; the results are not only unjust but also destructive. 
In the ecological domain it is equally clear that the common both defies and is 
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deteriorated by property relations. It defies property relations simply in the sense that 
the beneficial and detrimental effects of the environment always exceed the limits of 
property like they do national borders. Just as your land shares with the neighbor-
ing land the benefits of rain and sunshine, it will share too the destructive effects of 
pollution and climate change. Although the strategies of neoliberalism have been 
aimed perhaps most visibly at privatizing the public in terms of transport, services, 
or industries, they have also significantly involved projects to privatize the common, 
such as oil in Uganda, diamonds in Sierra Leone, lithium in Bolivia, and even the 
genetic information of the population of Iceland. The deterioration of the common 
by private property here also suggests a contradictory relation: the private nature 
of accumulation (through the profits of a polluting industry, for example) conflicts 
with the social nature of the resulting damages (the detriment that pollution causes 
to a wide range of forms of life). By putting together the two formulae, then, we can 
see the contradiction with the common on both sides, so to speak, of private prop-
erty: the increasingly common nature of production clashes with the private nature 
of capitalist accumulation and that private accumulation, in turn, clashes with the 
common, social nature of its detrimental effects.
Numerous powerful struggles have arisen in recent decades to combat neoliberal 
privatization of the common. A successful struggle that illustrates part of my argu-
ment here is the war over water that centered in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000, which, 
together with the war over gas that peaked in 2003 in El Alto, contributed to the 2005 
election of Evo Morales. The events were precipitated by a classic neoliberal script. 
The IMF pressured the Bolivian government to privatize the water system because 
it cost more to deliver clean water than the recipients paid for it. The government 
sold the water system to a consortium of foreign corporations, which immediately 
“rationalized” the price of water by raising it several-fold. The subsequent protests to 
de-privatize the water intersected with a variety of other efforts to maintain control 
over the common, in terms of natural resources, the forms of life of indigenous 
communities, and the social practices of the peasants and the poor. Today, with 
the disasters of neoliberal privatization becoming ever more evident, the task of 
discovering alternative means to manage and promote the common has become 
essential and urgent.
A second characteristic shared by the common in both domains, which is more 
abstract but not for that reason any less significant, is that it constantly disrupts and 
exceeds the dominant measures of value. Contemporary economists go through 
extraordinary gymnastics to measure the values of biopolitical goods such as ideas 
or affects. Often they cast these as “externalities” that escape the standard schema of 
measurement. Accountants struggle similarly with what they call “intangible assets,” 
the value of which seems to be esoteric. In fact, the value of an idea, a social relation, 
or a form of life always exceeds the value that capitalist rationality can stamp on it, 
not only in the sense that it is always a greater quantity but also and more importantly 
in that it defies the entire system of measure. (Finance, of course, plays a central role 
in the valuation of biopolitical goods and production and the current financial and 
economic crisis derives in large part, I would argue, from the inability of capitalist 
measurement to grasp the newly dominant forms of production. This is a complex 
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discussion, however, that I have to leave to another occasion.) A central character in 
Charles Dickens’s Hard Times is a factory owner, Thomas Gradgrind, who believes 
he can rationalize life by submitting to economic measure all aspects of it, including 
“affairs of the heart” such as his relationships with his children—but, as the reader 
quickly guesses, Gradgrind learns in the course of the novel that life exceeds the 
bounds of any such measure. Today even the value of economic goods and activ-
ity, since the common is increasingly central to capitalist production, exceeds and 
escapes the traditional measures.
In the ecological domain too the value of the common is immeasurable or, at 
least, does not obey the traditional capitalist measures of economic value. This is 
not to say that scientific measurement, such as the proportion of carbon dioxide or 
methane gases in the atmosphere, is not central and essential. Of course, it is. My 
point is rather that the value of the common defies measurement. Consider, as a coun-
terexample, the much-publicized arguments of Bjørn Lomborg against taking action 
to limit global warming. Like Mr. Gradgrind, Lomborg’s strategy is to rationalize the 
question by calculating the values involved in order to set priorities. The estimated 
value of the destruction expected by global warming, he concludes with an air of 
unimpeachable logic, does not merit the costs to combat it. An obvious problem 
with such an argument, however, is that one cannot measure the value of forms of 
life that are destroyed. What dollar amount should we assign to the submersion of 
half of Bangladesh under water, permanent drought in Ethiopia, or the destruction 
of traditional Inuit ways of life? Even contemplating such questions elicits the kind 
of nausea and indignation you feel when reading those insurance company schedules 
that calculate how much money you will be reimbursed for losing a finger at work 
and how much for an eye or an arm. 
The inability to grasp the value of the common with traditional capitalist mea-
sures provides one way to approach the various proposals for carbon trading schemes, 
which were much discussed in the official meetings at Copenhagen. Carbon trading 
schemes generally involve a cap to the production of carbon dioxide gases and other 
greenhouse gases so as to create a limited market in which the production of such 
gases can be given determinate economic values and traded. Such schemes, then, do 
not pretend directly to measure the value of the common, but instead claim to do so 
indirectly, by assigning monetary values to the production of gases that harm or cor-
rupt the common. It should come as no surprise that assigning determinate values to 
immeasurable commodities and assuming that market rationality will create a stable 
and beneficial system has in many cases in the past led to disaster—see, for example, 
the current financial crisis. And such property logics and market schemes are likely 
not to diminish but to exacerbate the global social hierarchies marked by poverty 
and exclusion. In any case, it seems clear to me that proposals relying on the capital-
ist measurement of value and the market rationality that presumably accompanies 
it cannot grasp the value of the common and address the problem of climate change 
at the fundamental level, even through such indirect means. Forms of life are not 
measureable, or, perhaps, they obey a radically different scale based on the value of 
life, a scale that we have not yet invented (or one that, perhaps, we have lost). 
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My primary point here is that just as the different forms of the common both 
rebel against property relations, so too they defy the traditional measures of capital-
ist rationality. These two shared logics are a significant basis for understanding both 
guises of the common and struggling together to preserve and further them. The 
shared qualities of the common in these two domains, which I have analyzed so far, 
should constitute a foundation for linking the forms of political activism aimed at 
the autonomy and the democratic management of the common. 
The struggles for the common in these two domains do operate in some respects, 
however, according to conflicting, even opposing logics. The central antinomy from 
which a series of others follow has to do with scarcity and limits. Ecological thought 
necessarily focuses on the finitude of the Earth and its life systems. Some argue, for 
instance, that the common can only sustain so many people living on the Earth 
and still be successfully reproduced. The Earth, others insist, especially its spaces of 
wilderness, must be defended against the damages of industrial development and 
other human activities. The scientific discourses about climate change are filled with 
limits and turning points, such as what will happen if there continues to be more 
than 350 parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere. A politics of the common in the 
economic and social realm, in contrast, generally emphasizes the unlimited character 
of production, although it conceives production primarily in not industrial but bio-
political terms. The production of forms of life, including ideas, affects, and so forth, 
has no fixed limits. That does not mean, of course, that more ideas are necessarily 
better, but rather that they do not operate under a logic of scarcity. Ideas are not 
necessarily degraded by proliferating them and sharing them with other people—
on the contrary. There is a tendency, then, for discussions in the one domain to be 
dominated by calls for preservation and limits, while the other is characterized by 
celebrations of limitless creative potential. 
This conceptual conflict between limits and limitlessness is reflected in the seem-
ingly incompatible slogans of the movements that met in Copenhagen. A favorite 
rallying cry of anticapitalist social movements in recent years has been “We want 
everything for everyone.” For those with an ecological consciousness of limits, of 
course, this sounds like an absurd, reckless notion that will propel us further down 
the route of mutual destruction. In contrast, a prominent placard at the public dem-
onstrations in Copenhagen warned “There is no Planet B.” For anticapitalist activists 
this too closely echoes the neoliberal matra popularized 30 years ago by the Margaret 
Thatcher government: “There is no alternative.” Indeed the struggles against neoliber-
alism of the past decades have been defined by their belief in the possibility of radical, 
seemingly limitless alternatives. In short, the World Social Forum motto, “Another 
world is possible,” might translate in the context of the climate changes movements 
into something like, “This world is still possible, maybe.”
In simplistic terms, indeed too simplistic, one might say that whereas ecological 
thought is aimed against economic development, or for curbs on it, advocates in the 
social and economic domain of the common are resolutely pro-development. This 
is too simplistic because the development in question in the two cases, as I said, is 
fundamentally different. The kinds of development involved in the social produc-
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tion of the common depart significantly from industrial development. In fact, once 
we recognize, as I mentioned earlier, that in the biopolitical context the traditional 
divisions between production and reproduction break down, it is easier to see that 
calls for preservation in the one case and creation in the other are not really opposed 
but complementary. Both perspectives refer fundamentally to the production and 
reproduction of forms of life. 
A second basic conceptual conflict between struggles for the common in the two 
domains has to do with the extent to which the interests of humanity serve as the 
frame of reference. Struggles for the common in the social and economic domain 
generally focus on humanity and indeed one of the most important tasks is to extend 
our politics successfully to all of humanity, that is, to overcome the hierarchies and 
the exclusions of class and property, gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity, and 
others. Struggles for the common in the ecological realm are much more likely, in 
contrast, to extend their frames of reference beyond humanity. In most ecological 
discourses human life is viewed in its interaction with and care for other life forms 
and eco-systems, even in cases when priority is still accorded to the interests of hu-
manity. And in many radical ecological frameworks the interests of non-human life 
forms are given equal or even greater priority to those of humanity. This is a real and 
important conceptual difference, it seems to me, which implies significant political 
differences, but I will have to defer to another occasion exploring these more fully. 
Let me instead return to the conceptual antinomy between limits and limitless-
ness to explore some of the differences of political strategy that derive from it. The 
first of these might be called the antinomy of governance between autonomy and 
state action. A central goal of anticapitalist and anti-neoliberal social movements 
has been to promote forms of autonomy and self-governance as means to challenge 
and destroy social hierarchies. The Zapatista communities have served as a power-
ful example to show that we can develop our power to rule ourselves by experi-
menting with democratic forms of governance. In the discourse of climate change 
movements, in contrast, political strategy generally focuses less on autonomy than 
on the need to compel states to act. This is due in part to the global nature of the 
problem. Autonomous communities might reduce their own levels of carbon dioxide 
production, for example, but that will do little to effect climate change if the major 
polluters are not stopped. States seem to be the only actors capable of achieving that, 
along with perhaps major corporations and supranational institutions like the United 
Nations. The appeal to states regarding global warming is due also to the urgency of 
the problem. There seems to be little time for experimentation or partial measures 
before it is too late to address the critical factors causing climate change. This political 
antinomy is not absolute, of course. Autonomous movements have always also been 
directed at states: in some cases to challenge state control and in others to cooper-
ate with progressive governments. And, in turn, many climate change movements 
value autonomy as a principle and even as a part of their strategy. But there remains 
a significant difference in priority and emphasis.
Another political antinomy has to do with the question of knowledge. Projects of 
autonomy and self-governance, as well as most struggles against social hierarchies, 
act on the assumption that everyone has access to the knowledge necessary for po-
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litical action. Workers in the factory, people of color in a white society, women in a 
male-dominated society have the daily experience of subordination that is the seed 
of rebellion. A long training is required, of course, to transform that indignation 
into a political project, but the assumption is that all have access to that basic knowl-
edge. This seems to me something like Spinoza’s basic assumption in De Intellectus 
Emandatione that “habemus enim ideam veram,” that is, we have a true idea or, rather, 
we have at least one true idea, which serves as foundation that subsequently we can 
build on and construct an edifice of knowledge. The assumption of a general ac-
cess to the experience and knowledge of subordination fills a similarly foundational 
role. Without this basic knowledge being open to all, democratic and horizontal 
projects of autonomy and self-governance would be inconceivable. The relationship 
to knowledge in climate change movements seems to me very different. Certainly, 
great importance is given to projects for public education about the nature of climate 
change and people’s experiences of changing climate is often invoked. But individual 
experience of climate change is very unreliable. Winters may get more severe in one 
area or one year and milder in others; rains may increase in one part of the world 
and decrease in another. None of these are adequate bases for understanding climate 
change. In fact, once any of us experience the effects of climate change in a verifiable 
way it will be far too late to stop its effects. The basic facts of climate change—for 
example, the increasing proportion of CO2 in the atmosphere and its effects—are 
highly scientific and abstract from our daily experiences. Projects of public pedagogy 
can help spread such scientific knowledge, but in contrast to the knowledge based in 
the experience of subordination, this is fundamentally an expert knowledge.
A third political antinomy, which is perhaps the most determinant, marks the 
distance between two temporalities. It is true that anticapitalist and anti-neoliberal 
movements always employ a rhetoric of urgency—insisting, for instance, that their 
demands be met now—but the temporality of autonomous community formation 
and democratic organizing is constitutive. Time is determined, in other words, by 
the process of organizing itself. The urgency of demands is really secondary to this 
constitutive temporality. In contrast, urgency is the primary temporality of climate 
change politics. Soon it will be too late to save the planet and maybe the time has 
already passed. This urgency emphasizes or exacerbates the gaps marked by the first 
two political antinomies. If there is no time then we cannot wait for generalized 
knowledges to develop or autonomous communities to grow. We need to act now 
with the experts and the ruling powers that exist. 
This antinomy of temporality casts the two movements as two faces of apocalypse. 
Anticapitalist movements are apocalyptic in the long tradition of millenarian and 
revolutionary groups that struggle to precipitate an event of radical transformation. 
The end of days is the beginning of a new world. The apocalyptic imagination of 
climate change movements, in contrast, sees radical change as final catastrophe. The 
change of the Earth’s climate will greatly diminish if not destroy the existing forms 
of life. The end of days is just the end.
I think it is useful to recognize the depth of these antinomies in order to under-
stand the challenges we face. I do not mean to suggest, though, that these differences 
make the encounter between anticapitalist movements and climate change move-
274 Two Faces of Apocalypse
ments impossible. Remember that ten years ago, at the time of the Seattle WTO 
protests, we faced a similar political antinomy between globalization and anti-global-
ization. The protesters declared themselves against the current forms of globalization 
but, rightly, resisted the media label of “anti-globalization” activists. It took time and 
great collective effort to develop concepts and practices of alterglobalization that 
shattered this antinomy. It is the task of the movements today to grasp the antinomies 
of the common, work through them, digest them, and create a new conceptual and 
practical framework. The work begun in Copenhagen opened the road for a long 
journey ahead. ■
